Mark Grear Mann
Boston University 

My aim in this essay is to establish a distinctly Wesleyan response to the problems posed to Christian theology by postmodernity, particularly that of the postmodern critique of epistemic foundationalism--perhaps the sine qua non of modern thought--which is one of the chief reasons Christian theologians have faced difficulties dealing with the problem of radical perspectivalism and the situation of pluralistic religious truth-claims.⁽¹⁾ What I wish to show is that a Wesleyanism informed by a dialogue with the pragmatism of Charles S. Peirce--a 'pragmatic Wesleyanism'--provides the epistemological basis for a constructive theological response to these issues that remains distinctly Wesleyan as a natural development of trajectories already present in Wesley's thought. Of course, this immediately raises the question: why would we want to engage Wesley with Peirce, founder of American pragmatism?⁽²⁾ An initial response is that Peirce's pragmatism provides a constructive way of addressing the critique of foundationalism and the challenge of pluralism and perspectivalism in a way that more self-consciously addresses the problems of modern foundationalism than we find or could have been possible with Wesley. As we shall see, Peirce himself developed his philosophy as a critique of Cartesian and Kantian foundationalism, entirely rejecting an incorrigible transcendental a priori as the starting point for knowledge.⁽³⁾ Because Peirce decisively sidesteps the modern problems against which postmodernity is a reaction without falling back upon fideistic fundamentalism or giving in to relativism or skepticism, there has been growing interest in Peirce's thought within philosophical circles in recent decades.⁽⁴⁾ In addition to being an important philosophical figure for constructively addressing postmodern issues, Peirce was also a devoted Christian who rejected the Unitarianism of his father (a highly regarded Harvard mathematician) for lifelong membership in the Episcopal Church.⁽⁵⁾ Another reason for engaging Wesley and Peirce is the striking similarities between them. This is important considering our interest in developing a distinctly Wesleyan mode for addressing postmodernity as, I believe and argue, Peirce's pragmatism offers a legitimate option for contemporary Wesleyans seeking a constructive response to the challenges of postmodernity that is still distinctly Wesleyan. This likely requires our being willing to move beyond Wesley, but also requires drawing upon Wesley as much as possible, seeking to follow the trajectories that are already set within his own thought.

Peirce's Pragmatism

Peirce's critique of modernity is found most concisely in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1868. In the first essay, Peirce outlines his empiricism while taking aim at the Cartesian method of universal doubt and its appeal to the individual human consciousness as the ultimate test of certainty. First, we have no ". . . intuitive faculty for distinguishing intuitive from mediate cognitions . . ." by which he means that we can never say with certainty that we have arrived at an unmediated starting point for knowledge, for our very attempt to do so presupposes previously mediated knowledge (5:244).⁽⁶⁾ Secondly, we can never identify a purely internal, self-consciousness, for ". . .all knowledge of the internal world is derived by hypothetical reasoning from our knowledge of external facts" (5:266). We neither possess a pure intuition of self-consciousness, nor an intuitive power to distinguish between ". . . the subjective elements of different kinds of cognitions" (5:242); instead, our only way of probing cognition is by reference to and inference from "external facts" (5:249). Third, all thinking takes place by way of mediation or "signs;" that is, every cognition is a sign that stands for its object in a certain respect.⁽⁷⁾ Peirce then turns his aim at Kant's claim that we cannot know a Ding an sich, to which he responds that through ". . . universal and hypothetical propositions, the truth of a thing cannot be cognized with absolute certainty, but it may be probably known by induction" (5:258). Peirce's final point is that "no cognition not determined by a previous cognition . . . can be known" (5:262), for all knowing is a seamless and endless process continuous with previous knowledge.⁽⁸⁾ Put simply, Peirce holds a radical empiricism in which all knowledge comes to us originally from without: there is no absolute cognitive ground innate to the mind.

However, Peirce is also optimistic about the knowledge we can gain of the world empirically because of the triadic relation that exists between ourselves and the world as mediated by signs. Although immediate or intuitive knowledge of things is not possible, we can possess meaningful knowledge by valid inference from our experiences and activity in the world. When our signs or ideas comply with our experience of the world, we may at least provisionally conclude some sense of correctness to them. And there is good reason to presume that we do a fair job of inferring correct cognitions of the external world via our senses as evident in the many achievements of science and technology, both based upon our ability to interpret our world with accurate signs. And, as always occurs in attempts to advance science and technology, each time that we discover that our signs or ideas are in error, we seek other signs and knowledge that will more accurately guide our activities. This details a very important point in Peirce's philosophy: all of our knowledge of particular things is fallible, thus subject to possible correction: ". . . of all beliefs, none is more natural than the belief that it is natural for man to err" (5:592). Thus, it is important to take seriously the knowledge that we do possess, but to balance this with the kind of humility that recognizes the fallibility and provisionality of all knowledge.

In his second essay Peirce further develops his pragmatic critique of the modern project. First, it makes no sense to begin a search for truth or knowledge with complete or universal doubt: "We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy . . . [which cannot] be expelled by a maxim, for there are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be mere self-deception, and not real doubt" (5:264), but "paper" or "counterfeit" doubt (6:499). Real doubt only arises when we experience something that surprises us or appears contrary to a belief that we actually hold; otherwise, there is no reason to doubt our beliefs except in search of an absolutely infallible foundation, already shown to be a dead end. Thus, there is no real reason for doubting the whole of our admittedly provisional and fallible knowledge. Secondly, to Descartes' assumption that ". . . the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness," Peirce counters that we can only ". . . hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue [within] the community of philosophers" (5:264). What community offers to the search for truth is the diversity of perspectives and experiences that makes possible the correction of errors; therefore a community of minds is more likely to possess true ideas than would a solitary mind. Thirdly, Cartesian argumentation depends upon reasoning ". . . by a single thread of inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises" (5:264). Rather, it is better to imitate the methods of the empirical sciences under which concrete premises are carefully scrutinized, and 'proven' by many different arguments. Says Peirce, "Reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and interconnected" (5:264). Finally, Cartesianism posits the will of God as an explanation for any facts that seem inexplicable, while Peirce believes that we can never allow such a supposition. Since, all judgments are hypothetical, ". . . the only reason for asserting any hypothesis is that it explains its topic. Never is there a reason, then, to affirm the hypothesis that something is inexplicable."⁽⁹⁾ In this way, Peirce embraces Hume's critique of the "God of the gaps" who keeps being pushed further and further into increasingly small recesses where our scientific knowledge does not yet reach. In sum, Peirce uses his empiricist epistemology as a direct critique of the modern 'project', boldly asserting that an absolutely certain and indubitable foundation for knowledge is not only impossible, but also unnecessary for practical knowing to occur. Peirce thus also betrays a trust in the ability of the human mind to conform its ideas and symbols to reality with a meaningful degree of accuracy. To better understand how this works, we now turn to Peirce's method of inquiry, which explains the process of knowing.

Peirce develops his method of inquiry by first distinguishing between two different states of mind: 'belief' and 'doubt'.⁽¹⁰⁾ Belief he pragmatically defines as the 'habit' which gives rise to and determines certain 'modes of action'; thus we betray our true beliefs much more through actions than through our words. Now, we experience the state of belief with a sense of calm or satisfaction. Real doubts, as we have seen, arise when we experience something that contradicts our beliefs such that our calm and satisfaction is replaced by irritation or an ". . . uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass [back] into a state of belief" (5:372). Peirce calls the method of this struggle 'inquiry', the sole purpose of which is to return to a state of calm through the "settlement of opinion" or "fixation of belief."

There are four methods by which to fix belief when doubt arises, which function much like stages that one works through when involved in inquiry. The first Peirce calls tenacity, which is the rigorous attempt to hold to one's belief despite the fact that it has been called into question. Although tenacity can be like an ostrich burying its head in the sand at the approach of danger, it is also admirable for its ". . . strength, simplicity, and directness," not to mention that the tenaciously held belief may prove in the long-run to be the correct belief (5:386). But this method finds the impulses of community against it, for one ". . . who adopts it will find that others think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will shake his confidence in his belief" (5:378). This reasserts the importance of community in the pursuit of true knowledge. When tenacity must be given up, one must resort to the second method of fixing belief: authority. By authority, Peirce means allowing larger institutions (such as the church or scripture) to have the authority to establish and fix our beliefs. History reveals authority to be capable of great cruelties, but it is superior to tenacity because it takes into account a wider community, and functions well in establishing ordered and efficiently functioning societies. But Peirce offers as a counterbalance to this the fallibility of knowledge, for ". . . no institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject," and individuals will always arise to question authority (5:381).

The third stage of inquiry is the a priori method. This involves the intentional gathering of individuals to develop new beliefs that are in harmony with what they consider to be central propositions. These need not agree with experience, but must fit with what the larger community is inclined to believe about the fundamental nature of things. This method gains respectability through its openness to the use of reason and the broad participation of community. However, this method also ". . . makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but taste, unfortunately, is always more or less a matter of fashion" (5:383). What is ultimately necessary to satisfy our doubts is a method that will open our inquiry to the test of external permanency, which Peirce defines as science. Scientific inquiry presumes that there are ". . . Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions about them, [that] by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are" (5:384). Scientific inquiry is the highest form of belief fixation for it avails itself to public and inter-subjective observation, and seeks to base its results on concrete facts that are exterior to the mind.⁽¹¹⁾ We also have, once again, the many triumphs and successes of the scientific method to commend it to us for the fixation of our beliefs.

But does scientific inquiry offer access to knowledge of God? If so, it would be based on the assumption that God is something that can be known like any other thing in this world. In answering this, we have seen that Peirce believed it makes no sense to hypothesize God simply because some things (e.g., miracles) evade present explanation. To assume, then, that scientific inquiry can get us to true knowledge of God, would seem to surrender to a kind of skepticism that shows our statements about God to be hypotheses of increasingly less probability as the reach of scientific explanation expands and grows. However, Peirce distinguishes between matters of scientific interest and those of "vital concern," recognizing that matters of vital concern must be treated differently.⁽¹²⁾ In approaching questions of vital concern, Peirce affirms that although our sentiments certainly are theoretically fallible, they arise from "hereditary instincts," which are more trustworthy than the best that scientific reasoning has to offer (1:661, 6:496).⁽¹³⁾ In other words, our natural attunement to the world through our senses and reasoning is merely an extension of a more fundamental, instinctual synchronization of who we are to the ultimate being of the universe, which is the ground of the nearly universal, religious impulse in humans.⁽¹⁴⁾ Thus, there is a kind of immediacy to our knowledge of God, which we can access by radically opening ourselves to be led by our heart instincts, which Peirce calls "musement."⁽¹⁵⁾

In his curiously titled article "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God," Peirce further details the importance of musement (6:452-493). The Neglected Argument ("N.A.") is actually three arguments, the first of which he calls the humble argument. Peirce begins by defining an Argument, as "any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief . . ." (6:456) thus showing his wish to demonstrate the reasonableness of the hypothesis of God's reality--rather than to prove this existence--as arising from musement. As we have seen, musement requires an attitude of pure receptivity.⁽¹⁶⁾ Musement, particularly upon the richness of the "Three Universes of Experience,"⁽¹⁷⁾ ". . . will inevitably suggest the hypothesis of God's Reality . . . [which] will sooner or later be found to be an attractive fancy . . . for its beauty, for its supplying an ideal of life, and for its thoroughly satisfactory explanation of the whole threefold environment" (6:465), which he surmises, has ". . . made more worshippers of God than any other" (6:486), for it bears the most practical religious vitality of any other argument.⁽¹⁸⁾

The second (the N.A. proper) is not actually an argument, but more of an ". . . apology--a vindicatory description--of the mental operations which the Humble Argument actually and actively lives out," and therefore consists of ". . . showing that the humble argument is the natural fruit of free meditation" (6:487). What this establishes, Peirce believes, is that there is in ". . . human nature . . . a latent tendency toward belief in God [that] is a fundamental ingredient of the soul" (6:487). Since Peirce gives great credence to the human instinctual capacity in discerning matters of vital importance, and musement--as the freeing up of instinctual knowing--bears a high degree of plausibility. Thus, the N.A. is Peirce's apology for the natural process that gives rise to the Humble Argument. What Peirce attempts to show in his third argument is that he has developed the first two arguments in accordance with his method of scientific inquiry, ". . . but an inquiry which produces, not merely scientific belief, which is always provisional, but also a living, practical belief, logically justified in crossing the Rubicon with all the freightage of eternity" (6:485). But in the end, Peirce concedes that the "theistic hypothesis" is not like normal scientific hypotheses. For example, the hypothesis of the Reality of God is in some sense indubitable, but this is only because what Peirce means by such an hypothesis is so vague that it is something to which the law of non-contradiction cannot apply (5:505).⁽¹⁹⁾ What Peirce falls back on is that ". . . it is better to depend on the vague deliverances of instinct where first principles are concerned, since in the long run such ideas are more trustworthy than the established results of science which presuppose them, although they cannot and should not be rendered precise."⁽²⁰⁾ Furthermore, by being vague we permit our ideas about God to really be about God, for vagueness is a form of indeterminateness, and indeterminateness preserves the true sense in which God, as infinite being, simply cannot be precisely classified as a part of a genus or class like other things (8:262).⁽²¹⁾ Peirce's attempt to follow his instincts to knowledge of God finally leaves him wandering in a vague mist where each step is a practical step of faith, but a faith both legitimate and reasonable.

Wesley's Transcendental Empiricism⁽²²⁾

Turning to Wesley, we take a necessary but temporary step away from directly addressing the issues of modernity. In many ways Wesley was a child of his era, and this was especially the case with regard to his religious epistemology. Wesley's life spanned the greater part of the 18^th century, a period marked by the triumph of empiricism in Britain, leaving its indelible trace on his thought. Although highly critical of David Hume, Wesley generally looked favorably upon the empirical philosophy of John Locke, and especially that of Peter Browne.⁽²³⁾ With reservations, he favorably reviewed Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, claiming that it contained ". . . many excellent truths, proposed in a clear and strong manner, by a great master both of reasoning and language"⁽²⁴⁾ Browne's Treatise on Human Understanding Wesley regarded as ". . . in most points far clearer and more judicious than Mr. Locke's, as well as designed to advance a better cause."⁽²⁵⁾ But Wesley also differed from the major proponents of empiricism, most notably in his greater optimism about what can be known about the world through the senses and what can be known directly of God. Wesleyan scholars have variously accounted for these differences by noting such influences as that of Cambridge Platonism (viz., that of John Norris of whom Wesley thought highly and with whom Wesley bears important similarities) and the Aristotelian logic that Wesley learned at Oxford, and which permeated his life's work.⁽²⁶⁾

That Wesley was an empiricist we detect most obviously in his rejection of innate knowledge, which he expressed in an oft quoted Latin phrase, "Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit prius in sensu," and which he translated, "There is nothing in the understanding which was not first perceived by some of the senses."⁽²⁷⁾ Furthermore, although acknowledging that our senses can make mistakes, he hesitated to admit that under normal circumstances they would, holding to an optimistic view of the ability of our senses to give us correct information about the world.⁽²⁸⁾ For this reason, Wesley was an ardent proponent of the scientific enterprise, which he believed provided an effective process for gaining accurate information about the natural world when exercised correctly. His Survey of the Wisdom of God in Creation--an abridged reprint of Genevan Johann Franz Buddeus' The Contemplation of Nature--was an extensive summary of the current state of scientific knowledge (Wesley referred to such knowledge as "Natural Philosophy") which he intended to make available to and for the benefit of common folk.

Wesley also believed that inference from our knowledge of the natural world (when combined with clear reason for which suitable logic is necessary!) offers a certain measure of knowledge about God, though there appears to have been some development in Wesley's view on this matter.⁽²⁹⁾ Prior to his mission to Georgia, Wesley expected immediate acceptance of Christianity by the Native Americans on the grounds that the gospel he proclaimed would fulfill their natural knowledge of divine matters. Following his lack of success as a missionary, Wesley was left with a much more pessimistic view of the powers of natural inference, though later in life he gradually regained a sense of faith in our ability to infer knowledge of the Creator through the study of creation. In the Survey, Wesley enunciates that it is possible to infer the existence of God as the first cause of all things via the relatedness of all things, and that we can infer "the goodness and justice of an All-perfect Being, the necessity of future rewards and punishments, and consequently the immortality of human souls."⁽³⁰⁾

Wesley balanced this optimism with what he believed was a realistic view of the limitations of natural sensual knowledge and of human reason. As he states in his sermon "The Imperfection of Human Knowledge," "Although our desire of knowledge has no bounds, yet our knowledge itself has . . . very narrow bounds; abundantly narrower than common people imagine, or men of learning are willing to acknowledge."⁽³¹⁾ But the real problem is not the limits of our natural knowledge, per se, but the kind of information to which we have access. Though we can infer some knowledge of God, we can only do so in vague, negative or abstract ways (e.g., God as "infinite" or "omnipresent"), which is to say nothing more than that God is of a "different species" from the rest of reality.⁽³²⁾ From Wesley's perspective, this is as good as not having any knowledge of God at all, for abstract knowledge is not the same thing as personal knowledge of God--a higher form of knowledge and can only come through a personal encounter with God.⁽³³⁾ And through merely natural, sensory means we have absolutely no access to this kind of knowledge of God.⁽³⁴⁾ There are two main reasons for our inability to access the true nature of God via natural philosophy. The first reason is that Wesley was fundamentally a metaphysical dualist, distinguishing soul and body, mind and matter, God and world in a way not unlike Descartes' res cogitans-res extensa split.⁽³⁵⁾ It is quite natural, then, that this metaphysical dualism would affect his epistemology, such that our physical senses only have true access to the physical or material world.⁽³⁶⁾ And because our physical senses are not attuned to direct knowledge of God or spiritual matters, Wesley maintains a consistent empiricism by claiming that we have "spiritual senses" which allow us access to the deeper realms of reality. The fact that we do not normally have active spiritual knowledge indicates that under normal conditions our spiritual senses are inactive, which Wesley attributes to the abuse of human liberty and the consequent effects of original sin. This, therefore, is the second reason for our inability to directly perceive spiritual truth.⁽³⁷⁾

Despite the limitations of our fallen condition, and quite in keeping with his views about the nature of salvific grace, Wesley believed that true knowledge of God is universally available in a limited fashion through prevenient grace: God's gracious presence to sinful human beings, calling them and empowering them toward salvation. And it is this grace that makes possible our reception of and free assent to the divine self-revelation which is God's offer of salvation through Christ. Wesley taught that there are both subjective and objective aspects of salvation. The objective is the classical Protestant doctrine of justification, which entails a "relative" change that transforms the nature of one's relation to God with subsequent "real" changes. The subjectively real transformation is sanctification; the initiation of sanctification is the new birth.⁽³⁸⁾

In terms of Wesley's epistemology, it is the transforming grace of the new birth that, by marking the decisive beginning point for the process of sanctification, triggers the definitive transformation of spiritual, perceptual abilities. First, the new birth ". . . quickens the natural senses," such that the soul, ". . . having an open intercourse with the visible world, acquires more and more knowledge of sensible things."⁽³⁹⁾ Secondly, the new birth enlivens the spiritual senses, enabling them finally to discern what is spiritual good from evil.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Wesley likely drew his idea of spiritual senses from the Cambridge Platonist John Norris,⁽⁴¹⁾ though Wesley put his own empiricist twist on the idea, comparing them roughly to the physical senses by explaining that their transformation in the new birth is analogous to the quickening that occurs in our physical senses at physical birth.⁽⁴²⁾ In his sermon "The Great Privilege of those that Are Born of God" he even describes the result of the new birth as enabling one to "hear" the voice of God and to "see" the light of God, like "having a veil removed."⁽⁴³⁾

In his sermon "On the Discoveries of Faith" Wesley further outlines the way that spiritual and religious knowledge functions, describing two different levels of spiritual sensation which he calls the "faith of a servant" and "the faith of a son."⁽⁴⁴⁾ The faith of a servant is general knowledge of God and spiritual matters, which enables believers to "see" the reality and truth of the "invisible realm" of God and spirits, the "eternal realm" of judgment and heaven, and the "spiritual realm" or true spiritual condition of their own lives in terms of growth in salvation. This is important, but its goal is an even deeper form of knowledge that is the "faith of a son," involving a growing assurance that God loves us, which deepens until we receive the "full assurance of faith" in which all "doubts and fears vanish away."⁽⁴⁵⁾ That Wesley depicts this type of faith as the pinnacle of knowledge is very telling of the practical and experiential accent of his epistemology. As Yoshio Noro aptly points out, the true aim of all inquiry and understanding is the deepening of one's "existential relationship to the will of God revealed in Christ."⁽⁴⁶⁾ For Wesley, the highest form of knowledge is a profound and life-transforming faith.

Because of this emphasis, Wesley often found himself accused of being an enthusiast and a mystic--neither of which someone like Wesley would want to be called, especially during the height of the Enlightenment! In defense against these allegations, Wesley attempted to articulate the importance both of reason and the objective grounds of faith, though not in such a way that would elevate reason above faith, as was the tendency of rationalism. For objective grounds of faith, Wesley primarily spoke of "testimony," of which there are two kinds: "human testimony" and "divine testimony."⁽⁴⁷⁾ Human testimony arises as individuals attempt to express their own subjective experience of God, often in terms of their "inner feelings." We can see just how important inner feeling was as a litmus test for Wesley just by looking at how seriously he took his own inner feelings as a measure for evaluating the condition of his spiritual life. In a journal entry from January 8, 1738 he refers to inward feeling as "the most infallible of proofs," and in commenting on his famous Aldersgate experience some months later he exclaims, "I felt my heart strangely warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation" [emphasis mine].⁽⁴⁸⁾ No wonder that critics might have accused him of mysticism or enthusiasm!

Yet Wesley also sought to develop standards by which to objectively judge the verity of inner feeling and experience, as well as testimony to such feeling and experience by others, for which he offered three standards by which to judge their truth. First, reason must judge the "intelligibility" of the testimony, or its ability to make sense of experience or reality as we experience it in the larger sense. Secondly, there can be no "contradiction" or "incoherence" in the testimony. Third, we must judge the "ability and integrity" of the one giving testimony.⁽⁴⁹⁾ In each of these measures, Wesley displays a fundamental trust in the power of human reasoning to provide critical guidance for the acceptance or rejection of the testimony of others. Inherent in this is Wesley's view that true authentication of testimony occurs best within a sympathetic yet critical community of persons, as we see in the importance that he gave to small-group participation for spiritual guidance and to annual conferences in doctrinal matters.⁽⁵⁰⁾ In this sense, experience and testimony can be broadened to include much of the tradition of the church, for it is the church traditions that record the testimony of the church as it developed through history.⁽⁵¹⁾

But for Wesley, the ultimate "objective" test for experience, feelings and tradition is the testimony of scripture. Because of its divine origin, Wesley considered scripture the ultimate objective standard or "touchstone" in all matters of authority and faith.⁽⁵²⁾ However, despite the fact that Wesley lived before the days of serious biblical criticism, his thought still bears the recognition of its infancy and his awareness of the problems of affirming a literal dictation theory, or in pushing scripture into uses for which he felt it was never intended. So, he readily acknowledged discrepancies between "scriptural expressions" and recent discoveries of science adding that the "scriptures were never intended to instruct us in philosophy, or astronomy; and therefore on those subjects, expressions are not always to be taken in the literal sense, but for the most part, as accommodated to the general apprehension of mankind."⁽⁵³⁾ But while essentially rejecting a "fundamentalist" view of scripture, Wesley also rejected the skepticism of historians and philosophers like Lessing, maintaining that there are objective principles by which one can judge the reliability of the biblical witness, for although scripture reflects the mark of human mediation, its truth as divine revelation is established by its "breadth, depth, antiquity, and miracles."⁽⁵⁴⁾ In the end, however, Wesley believed that these factors only showed the "mere probability" of scriptural truth, that ultimately the truths of the Bible could not be established except from the perspective of faith, ". . . for it is faith that enables one to 'judge truly' and 'reason justly'"⁽⁵⁵⁾ (446). For Wesley, only someone who has entered into the deeper life of faith can truly understand that faith's point of departure is built on solid ground and not shifting sand.⁽⁵⁶⁾

Obviously Wesley was working a complex dialectic in his search to find a via media between rationalism and enthusiasm. In one sense he sought--through the divine testimony of scripture, in corporate experience and testimony (including therein the traditions of the church) and logical reasonableness--an objective basis for what Christians accepted as authoritatively true. But in another sense, he affirmed that the truth of scripture can only be seen through the eyes of faith (and by the "direct witness of the Holy Spirit"), that one's "inner feelings" are always a voice of authority, and that even our reasoning must be quickened by faith to function properly. Knowledge of the natural world is both possible and important for our life within it, but the true fulfillment of the human ability and desire to know can only occur at a supernatural level through faith. With the activation of the spiritual senses in faith, believers are gifted with a new way of seeing reality and an entirely new way of knowing truth.⁽⁵⁷⁾

Making Connections: Toward a Pragmatic Wesleyanism

We began our investigation by noting that there are important similarities and connections between Wesley and Peirce, and we now stand at a position from which we can investigate them in a detailed fashion. First, we have seen that both are empiricists in their fundamental epistemological convictions, and through their empirical orientations essentially avoid the postmodern critique of epistemic foundationalism; that is, both themselves are nonmodern nonfoundationalists. This is not to say that all empiricists are nonfoundationalists, as it is certainly possible to consider our empirical knowing as absolute and indubitable. Indeed, at times Wesley himself seems to betray such an empirical foundationalism though his great optimism about what can be known about the world through the senses, and even what can be known directly of God. Yet Wesley also expressed deep reservations about what we can know empirically about God, highlighting the vast limits of human knowledge, and at times even indicating that there is nothing that can be known with certainty.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Peirce, as we have seen, offers a more direct critique of the Cartesian and Kantian search for an indubitable epistemic foundation in pure rationalism, and self-consciously avoids replacing this with an empiricist foundationalism by rejecting all forms of certainty with his fallibilism and provisionalism. Because of the general epistemological orientation that Wesley and Peirce share in common, I consider it legitimate to follow the hints that Wesley offers, and to stretch him in the direction of a Peircian nonfoundational empiricism.

Second, both Peirce and Wesley repudiate the modern proclivity to posit the individual consciousness as the ultimate test of certainty. Instead, they contend that our best chance at arriving at true ideas or knowledge is within the context of a community in which differing perspectives and viewpoints serve as a corrective for the errors of each. This is not to say, however, that individuals are subsumed by the corporate whole, for the perspective and experience of each individual is of great value for the corporate inquiry. Both affirm, therefore, that in the long run, it is the community of inquirers (Peirce) or community of believers (Wesley) that bears the greatest chance of correctly discerning the truth.

Third, both Wesley and Peirce also believed that there is a deeper reality that common perception and reason cannot access, and that this deeper reality is, in fact, the realm of greatest importance to human life. Therefore, they both affirm, a special kind of sensitivity is required for us to achieve knowledge of the greater and deeper truths of life. Wesley, of course, spoke of this in more traditional theological terms, and his epistemological dualism betrays a metaphysical dualism that we do not find with Peirce. Cartesian dualisms (often noted to include God/world, supernatural/natural, mind/body, spirit/matter, etc.) have been one of the chief whipping boys of postmodernity, and not without good reason considering the various forms of injustice to which they have been related.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Because of this, and fundamental paradigm shifts in the sciences, there has been an almost universal trend in theology over the past two centuries to emphasize a greater, more holistic continuity between God and the world, grace and nature, the mind and body, etc. Such a dualism does exist in Wesley's epistemology, though I think those who accuse Wesley of affirming a "radical" dualism (i.e., John Cobb) do not accurately account for the subtlety of Wesley's understanding of God's immanence through his views of the Holy Spirit and prevenient grace. But the fundamental point holds true: Wesley maintains a dualism that is no longer tenable, and which requires Wesley as a consistent empiricist to affirm the reality of actual spiritual senses, a notion that is entirely unconvincing to the contemporary mind.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In this regard, Peirce offers a helpful mode of rethinking spiritual senses with a more tenable vision of reality that makes possible a greater sense of continuity between natural and supernatural knowledge. His distinction between the kind of knowledge available to scientific inquiry and that concerning matters of vital concern is based on a "difference of degree," for instinct--the deepest form of knowing and that best attuned to "spiritual" matters--is merely a more natural and fundamental way of knowing than is reasoning. Peirce's attempt to follow his instincts to the reality of God via musement in the "Neglected Argument" reflects his ardent belief that God is not some great other, but somehow deeply related to humanity, and can be known to us through our utterly unrestrained openness to God and God's truth. From a Wesleyan perspective, however, the problem with Peirce is that he does not appropriately account for the problem of sin as a deterrent to human openness to God's self-revelation, though, considering his fallibilism, Peirce likely would want to affirm this point. What Peirce's ideas of musement and instinct show is that it is possible to conceive of a spiritual sensitivity that exceeds normal, physical sensation--as both clearly do--without affirming actual spiritual senses.

Fourth--and obviously related to this last point--both Wesley and Peirce affirm that true religious knowledge is not knowledge about God or spiritual matters, but deeply experiential knowledge of God and spiritual matters. In other words, both were very pragmatic in their philosophical and theological orientation, believing that ultimate truth is not primarily an abstract set of ideas, but a fundamental way of being in the world with implications for the entirety of life.⁽⁶¹⁾ As we have seen, Wesley affirmed that the single highest form of knowledge is the personal and experiential "faith of a son."⁽⁶²⁾ For Peirce, this is best expressed in his belief that the true strength of the God hypothesis is its sheer power to inspire wonder, and to shape persons' lives.

The fifth point of connection between Wesley and Peirce is their mutual affirmation that faith is necessary for discerning the truth of theological and religious claims. This, of course, relates directly to the two points we have just discussed as faith is necessary because of the limitations of natural, sensory knowledge, and is itself a more personal, experiential form of knowledge than cognitive forms. But my purpose in speaking of faith separately from these two points is to more directly acknowledge that faith itself provides a perspective from which religious truth can be seen and affirmed that is otherwise unattainable. This is important to recognize because of the postmodern contention that there is no objective standpoint--as modernism assumes--from which to judge the verity of any affirmation. Wesley and Peirce essentially both accept this critique, and then sidestep it by affirming that truth can only be seen through the eyes of faith. In other words, both fully embrace that all ultimate truth-claims are essentially statements of faith the truth of which cannot be discerned or proven aside from the perspective of faith itself. Peirce takes this point even further, adding that all knowledge--because of its fallibility and provisionality--is only the result of steps of faith which he calls hypotheses. What this also means is that the life of faith--not unlike a scientific hypothesis--is the actual proving ground of the truth of faith's claims. In other words, faith itself is a kind of inquiry: religious truth cannot be ascertained without a leap of faith, and faith becomes the way in which the religious truth-claims are tested, which also means that the falsity of such claims can and should be shown if they are false through faith. This last point is definitely more Peircian than Wesleyan, as, for Wesley, the highest form of religious knowledge is the faith of a "son." But it would be wrong to think that for Wesley this means that such faith should be childlike in the sense of being naive or absolutely uncritical.⁽⁶³⁾ Wesley's high view of critical reason and the importance he gave to the critical function of community mitigate against such a view. What both hold in common, then, is that faith is the central means of discerning the truth of religious "knowledge."

Sixth, both Wesley and Peirce possess a striking openness to the perspectives of others and a humble willingness to be corrected and to change. As I have already indicated, finding a method for making one's ideas and beliefs vulnerable to correction is perhaps the central theme of Peirce's pragmatism. For Peirce, this comes as a fundamental trust in the organic attunement of the human mind and the world/reality, and a conviction that the truth can practically make itself known to us through our openness to it.⁽⁶⁴⁾ While a scientific provisionalism is not as central to Wesley's thought as it is to Peirce's, clearly Wesley ascribes to a kind of fallibilism which he expressed in his claim that ". . . it is the lot of humanity to be ignorant of many things, and liable to err" ("humanum est errare et nescire"), and his willingness "to give up every opinion" which he could not "by calm, clear reason defend."⁽⁶⁵⁾ Even more importantly, Wesley practically patterned this fallibilism in his own life through his continual willingness to change his mind and convictions. In all, Wesley combined a tenacity for his beliefs with a humble readiness to have his fallible mind changed and a willingness above all else to offer others charity despite disagreement that clearly reflects the spirit of Peirce's pragmatic provisionalism.⁽⁶⁶⁾

A final important point of connection between Peirce and Wesley concerns their dynamic methods for discerning the truth. Peirce's method is one of explicit inquiry. It begins not with doubt but with the actual, practical beliefs that an individual or community holds. Only when a belief is seriously called into question by real doubt does true inquiry begin, practically moving through a process (which includes tenacity, authority, a priori, and science) of increased openness to exploring, affirming, and testing new beliefs. What we identify as Wesley's methodology in the so-called Wesleyan quadrilateral functions much like this. Despite the fact that Wesley regarded scripture as the standard by which to measure all other forms of testimony, in practice he typically began by taking for granted the testimony or beliefs given to him by his Anglican tradition, which he seriously doubted only when his belief in it was called into question by some contradictory experience or new understanding of scripture.⁽⁶⁷⁾ Then, his method was to utilize scriptural authority in dynamic dialogue with tradition, reason and experience for a new way to formulate his view of the matter, seeking to do so in a way that would honor all of them.⁽⁶⁸⁾

Of course, the methods of Wesley and Peirce are also decisively different, and where this difference exists, I believe Wesleyans have much to gain from a serious consideration of Peirce. The key difference is that Peirce was willing to go a step further than Wesley in being open to correction, even at the risk of seriously rethinking authority--for Wesley, the authority of scripture. In this regard, Peirce made reality itself his ultimate authority, and his own thought can be seen as an elaborate program for engendering an openness that would enhance his beliefs being corrected by reality as it is. Thus, it would be quite natural for him to be willing to question the truth of such an authority as scripture if called into question by some contradictory experience or by an alternative belief that more convincingly explained reality. Before doing so, of course, he would likely apply the a priori method to rethink the whole of scripture around tenaciously held central propositions; but if this still proved unsuccessful in fixing his beliefs, then he would likely consider seriously rethinking the way that scripture might continue to be used as an authority. Considering the centrality of scripture for Wesley as the touchstone and final authority in all matters pertaining to religious testimony, it is difficult to imagine him ever abandoning the authority of the Bible or even merely giving it a place of secondary importance in matters of doctrine and faith. But if we also consider Wesley's openness to having his views informed by science and personal experience, it is equally difficult to imagine him retreating to a fundamentalist view of scripture. Considering Wesley's embrace of the fallibility of all knowledge and the results of two centuries of biblical criticism, it is at least conceivable that Wesley might be willing to give up his view of scripture as the final, ultimate, and infallible authority in all matters, even those pertaining to faith. This would not mean necessarily discounting the truth or authority of scripture, though this might require--in terms of Wesley's quadrilateral--developing a hermeneutic in which the claims of scripture are engaged with reason, tradition and experience (including both the experience of the individual and the various communities of inquiry) in a dialogical encounter that is equally true to all of the elements of the quadrilateral. Therefore, it is not too great of a stretch to imagine Wesley being comfortably embracing Peirce's method of inquiry as a mode for theological discourse in a postmodern era.

References

1. According to Richard Lints, "The Postpositivist Choice: Tracy of Lindbeck?" Journal of the American Academy of Religion 61:4 (Winter 1993), 655-77, the collapse of epistemic foundationalism and the resulting confusion over the nature and criteria of truth is the main source of consternation about postmodernity among theologians.

5. See John E. Smith, "Religion and Theology in Peirce," Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 251-270. As Smith points out, "It is striking indeed to find that one who, because of his marked interest in the pure sciences and his belief in the centrality of mathematical logic is often considered to be an 'emancipated' mind, not only took the religious concern seriously but even upheld the indispensable character of the church." Peirce, although largely avoiding theological speculation, outlines some details of his theism in "Answers to Questions Concerning My Belief in God." All citations of Peirce are from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), and by convention list volume and paragraph numbers.

22. This phrase originated with George Cell, but is also used by Rex Matthews who utilizes it to "indicate that Wesley's essentially empiricist epistemology functions in the 'transcendent' realm of 'God and the things of God' through the 'spiritual senses' of faith" My use of the phrase is meant to imply the same. Cf. George Cell, The Rediscovery of John Wesley, (New York: Henry Hold, 1935); and Rex Dale Matthews, "Religion and Reason Joined: A Study in the Theology of John Wesley," (Th.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1986), n. 289.

23. Wesley considered Hume, along with Rousseau and Voltaire, to be worse than an atheist (Works 7:271).

24. Wesley, "Remarks upon Mr. Locke's 'Essay on Human Understanding,'" Works, 13:464.

25. Wesley, Journal (6 December 1756), Works, 2:390.

27. Wesley, "On the Discoveries of Faith," Works, 7:231; "The Difference Between Walking by Sight, and Walking by Faith," Works, 7:259; et al.

28. As he states in A Survey of the Wisdom of God in the Creation: A Survey of the Wisdom of God in the Creation: A Compendium of Natural Philosophy, in 2 vols. (New York: N. Bangs and T. Mason, for the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1823), 2:370: "The senses do not deceive us, for they are not judges of the nature of things; but serve only to inform us of the connexion and relation between the bodies surrounding us and our own, in subserviency to our happiness in this life . . . the objects of our perception are those things which act upon our senses."

29. For a detailed analysis of Wesley's development in this regard, see Randy L. Maddox, Responsible Grace: John Wesley's Practical Theology (Nashville: Kingswood Books of Abingdon Press, 1994), 29-30.

30. Wesley, Survey, 2:440-1.

31. Wesley, "The Imperfection of Human Knowledge," Works, 6:337.

32. Wesley, Survey, 2:433-4.

33. Wesley's view here echoes the famous words Blaise Pascal penned on the night of his dramatic conversion: "God of Abraham, God of Isaac, God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and scholars."

34. See Yoshio Noro, "Wesley's Theological Epistemology," trans. by John W. Krummel, in Iliff Review, 28:1 (Winter 1971), 59-76.

35. Wesley most coherently and explicitly expresses his dualistic anthropology in his sermon "What is Man?" where he declares that "Unquestionably I am something distinct from my body" and speaks of the human body as the house for the soul (Works 7:228-9). Cf. Matthews, op. cit., 290.

36. See Mitsuo Shimizu, "Epistemology in the Thought of John Wesley." (Ph.D. Dissertation, Drew University, 1980), 171. See also Matthews, op. cit., 289-90.

46. Noro, 60.

47. Wesley, Survey, 2:447. I frame my discussion here in terms of "testimony" rather than the "Wesleyan Quadrilateral" primarily because this is how Wesley explicitly frames the issue of authority.

48. Wesley, Journal (8 January 1738), Works, 1:72; Journal (19 May 1738), Works, 1:103.

49. Wesley, Survey, 2:447.

50. See Randy L. Maddox, "The Enriching Role of Experience," Wesley and the Quadrilateral: Renewing the Conversation (ed. W. Stephen Gunter with contributions by Maddox, Gunter, Scott J. Jones, Ted A. Campbell and Rebekah L. Miles), (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997). The importance of conference is a point made consistently by all of the contributors. Maddox's claim in particular is that Wesley's "appeal to experience . . . was typically to an external, long-term, communal reality" for in assessing religious experience he carefully observed and studies not only his own life, but "the lives of his Methodist people, and human life in general." Cf., Responsible Grace, 46. Yoshio Noro agrees, adding that for Wesley, "experience is not individualistic but is understood as experience within the fellowship of believers." Cf. op. cit., 60.

51. Wesley took church tradition very seriously, but he was not uncritical of it. For him, the most authoritative tradition was the writing of the Ante-Nicene Fathers, which he considered the purest expression of scriptural Christianity, and the Anglican Articles of Faith which he considered the truest contemporary rendering of the ancient faith. But even with these, he was never entirely uncritical, responding to these traditional voices as he would to any other form of "testimony."

52. See Wesley, Survey, 2:447.

53. Ibid., 2:139.

54. Ibid., 2:477-78.

55. Ibid., 2:446.

56. See Laurence W. Wood, "Wesley's Epistemology," Wesleyan Theological Journal, 10 (Spring 1975), 48-59.

57. It is with good reason, then, that John B. Cobb discusses Wesley's epistemology in his chapter on faith, and that Laurence Wood claims that faith is the key to Wesley's epistemology. Cf. John B. Cobb, Grace and Responsibility: A Wesleyan Theology for Today, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1995), 68-76 and Wood, op. cit.

58. See especially "The Imperfection of Human Knowledge," Works 6:337-350.

59. They also arise, claim many feminists critics, from a particularly male experience of life.

60. Cf. Cobb, 72.

61. Cf. Laurence W. Wood, "Wesley's Epistemology," Wesleyan Theological Journal 10 (Spring 1975), 48-59.

62. This is reflected in his belief that the most essential doctrines are those practically and directly pertaining to salvation: original sin, justification by faith, the new birth, and holiness of heart and life. Cf. Maddox, "Opinion, Religion and 'Catholic Spirit': John Wesley on Theological Integrity," Asbury Theological Journal 47.1 (1992), 76-77.

63. For Wesley, the phrase "faith of a son" is meant to imply that the such knowledge comes from a very personal relationship--as between loving father and child--rather than the less personal, more duty-oriented and fear-based "faith of a servant." Cf. Wesley, "The Discoveries of Faith," op. cit.

64. In his youth Peirce optimistically defined truth as that destined to be believed by the community of inquiry in the long-run, though he gave nuance to this later in life by pointing out that he meant an infinite, that is, that there is no actual, finite time at which such a final belief could or will be held.

65. Wesley, "A Short Address to the Inhabitants of Ireland," Works 9:176. For a thorough analysis of Wesley's fallibilism see Maddox, "Opinion, Religion and 'Catholic Spirit,'" op. cit., 63-87.

66. This ideal is most clearly outlined in Wesley's sermon "Catholic Spirit," Works 5:492-504.

67. Maddox, Responsible Grace, 47.